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The Old Age Security Hypothesis and Population Growth
SUMMARY
In traditional societies it is often argued that parents' desire for old
age security in the form of transfers from their children provides an impor—
tant motive for childbearing. Some doubt has been cast on this "oldage
security hypothesis" by recent estimates which suggest that the rate of return
on investments in children tend to be negative in most developing countries.
This paper presents a theoretical model which integrates micro—level
decision making about fertility and life cycle consumption intoa dynamic
macro—level model of overlapping generations in order to investigate the im-
plications of this hypothesis. In this model, observation of a negative rate
of return to children and positive population growth in a traditionalsociety
may imply (1) that the old age security motive for childbearing is, in fact,
very strong; (2) that the rate of population growth is "too high" from a
Paretian point of view; and (3) that each individual in current and all
future generations could be made better off if the rate ofpopulation growth
were lower and the level of old age consumption were increased, but that a
reduction in population growth alone would reduce welfare. A socialsecurity
tax and transfer policy could be devised to induce a Pareto optimal rate of
population growth and distribution of life cycle consumption only if measures
are taken to offset the divergence between the private and social rate of
return to children created by the social security scheme.
Robert J. Willis
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(516) 246—3407Introduction
It has long been hypothesized that an important and perhaps
dominant motivation for childbearing in traditional societies
stems from the economic returns that parents expect to receive
from their children in the form of child labor and old age
security.1 With a few exceptions, there has been surprisingly
little attention given to this hypothesis in the recent spate of
microeconomjc models of fertility.2 To some extent this may be
explained by the fact that most of the economic models have been
directed toward explaining fertility in the United States and other
advanced countries in which, presumably, economic motivations for
childbearing are minor. Another part of the explanation for the
neglect of the old age security hypothesis by economists may follow
from evidence that the rate of return to investments in children
is low or negative, even in traditional societies in which the
elderly do appear to rely on their children for support.3 Fre-
quently, a low or negative rate of return from child investments
is cited as evidence for the proposition that the economic motiva-
tion for fertility is weak.
In this paper, I present some results of a theoretical inves-
tigation of the old age security hypothesis as part of a longer
theoretical study of population growth, fertility behavior and
family structure in developing countries.4 One 0f these results
suggests that it may be inappropriate to infer that negative rates
of return to children imply that the economic motivation for child-
bearing is weak. Rather, the combination of a negative rate of2
return and a positive rate of population growth may imply a very
strong economic motivation for childbearing because parents need
to have a large number of children in order to obtain a subsistence
level of old age consumption. A further implication is that popula-
tion growth in such circumstances is inefficiently high in the sense
that each individual in current and future generations could be
made better off if (a) the rate of population growth were lower
and (b) the level of transfers to the elderly from the economically
active segment of the population were increased.I show that an
efficient rate of population growth implies that the rate of return
to children must be equal to the rate of population growth. Other
theoretical results, some of which are briefly described in this
paper, include the effect on fertility behavior of variations in
mortality; of the introduction of monetary savings, land markets
or other non-human forms of asset holding; of investments in human
capital and a theory of the determinants of the distribution of
income among families and by age under conditions of Maithusian
diminishing returns.
These results are obtained in a theoretical model that
represents a significant departure from much of the recent litera-
ture on the microecononiics of fertility in two respects. First,
the rnicroeconomic model of fertility decisions assumes that children
are treated purely as capital goods. That is, parents do not
receive any direct utility from their children; their only motiva-
tion for childbearing stems from the expectation tha.t children
will support them in old age. This assumption is made for simplicity3
in order to highlight the implications of purely economic motiva-
tions for fertility. It will also help to identify the circum-
stances under which a direct preference for children or some other
non-economic motivation for fertility is important. Second and
more importantly, the micro model of fertility is embedded in a
dynamic general equilibrium framework of overlapping generations of
a type first suggested by Paul Samuelson. (1958). With a few ex-
ceptions, the Samuelson model has not yet been applied to problems
of demographic behavior; Samuelson and most subsequent users of the
framework assumed that fertility is exogenous.5 Yet, in my view,
this framework provides an extraordinarily simple and powerful tool
for analyzing the aggregate implications of micro behavior for
population growth, economic welfare and the distribution of income.
It is also suggestive of reasons why demographic behavior may be
subject to a variety of normative restrictions on the pursuit of
individual self-interest, a favorite theme of some sociological
students of fertility.6
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first section,
I specify the overlapping generations framework for a simple
agrarian society in which resources are abundant so that population
growth is not limited by dininishing returns.In this section, I
analyze the possible relationships between population growth and
the age distribution of consumption and the evaluation of these
possibilities in terms of the welfare of individuals in current
and future generations. This analysis is deliberately non-
behavioral and divorced from any consideration of the economic,4
social and institutional setting in which reproduction and the
distribution of consumption takes place. However, the analytical
framework and many of the results provide the basis for the
behavioral analysis that is presented later. One of the main
results of this section is the derivation of a square root formula
for efficient fertility and a corresponding formula for an effi-
cient consumption possibility frontier which shows the maximum
level of adult consumption that is attainable for any given level
of childhood and old age consumption. These formulas imply that
the optimal rate of population growth is higher, the higher is
the ratio of old age to childhood consumption. A second main
result is the derivation of a Golden Rule of distribution and
population growth and examination of other possible Pareto optimal
and non-Pareto optimal distribution and fertility levels.
In the second section, I turn to an analysis of individual
fertility and distribution behavior. Some of the main hypotheses
that emerge from this analysis have been mentioned earlier in the
introduction and will not be repeated here.In the third section,
I briefly consider some policy issues. For example, I show that
a mandatory social security tax and transfer scheme might be
imposed that would increase the welfare of each individual in current
and all future generations and reduce the rate of population growth.
Paradoxically, I also show that self-interested voters might never
vote to implement such a scheme.5
Optimal Population Growth and the Optimal Distribution
of Life Cycle Consumption
Consider a primitive agricultural society in which food,
the only consumption good, is produced on family plots of land
by an adult family head. Assuming that there is no technical
change, no physical capital, that all adults are equally produc-
tive, and that land is abundant, an adult family head in any period
t produces Ct units of food by using land up to the point at
which its marginal product is zero. Output per adult or, equiv-
alently, income per family is constant and aggregate output in
any period is proportional to the number of adults in the popula-
tion. Also assume that food is not storable across periods; it
must be consumed in the period in which it is produced or it spoils.
Each individual is assumed to live for three periods of equal
length as a dependent child, as a productive adult and as a
dependent elderly person. For simplicity, assume that reproduction
is asexual ,thatit occurs at the beginning of adulthood and that
there exists an exogenous mortality regime in which the survival
rate to adulthood is l and the conditional survival rate from
adulthood to old age is 2• Thus, B births to an adult in period
t will be expected to produce s1Bt adults in period t+l and
SiS2Bt elderly in period t+2. Also for simplicity, I abstract
from the facts that the number of births is discrete and the number
of survivors among the births to a given adult is random. Rather,
I assume that Bt is a continuous variable and that S1Bt and s1S2Bt
are deterministic.6
The life cycle consumption of an individual born in any
period t who survives through old age is Cj units of food during
childhood, C÷1 units of food during adulthood and C.4.2 units
of food during old age.I shall assume that each individual is
perfectly selfish in the sense that his utility is a function only
of his own current and future consumption and is independent
of the consumption of others.I also assume, for now, that all
individuals have identical tastes and face identical and constant
mortality rates. The lifetime utility of an individual born in
period t is
Vt =V(C,C1, c2; Si, 2)• (1)
Since the survival rates s1 and 2 are assumed constant and
identical for all individuals, they will be suppressed for nota-
tional simplicity. The lifetime utility of adults in period t
may be written as
=U(C,C.) =V(1
,c,c1 ) (2)




where bars over the amounts of past consumption indicate that
these quantities are not subject to choice and are therefore
exogenous. Finally, I assume that an individual requires a
minimum consumption level of I units of food per period to
survive.7
Any viable society must provide for reproduction and the
nurture of its young. Moreover, if the unproductive elderly
years are not to be foreshortened by starvation, society must
also provide a mechanism by which the consumption of the elderly
exceeds their productivity. Before considering how social insti-
tutions may arise to cope with the problems of reproduction and
the distribution of income by age over the life cycle, it is useful
to establish the nature of the technical possibilities open to our
hypothetical society and to see how to evaluate these possibilities
in terms of the welfare of individuals in current and future gener-
ations. The analysis of this section is therefore deliberately
non-behavioral and divorced from any consideration of the economic,
social and institutional setting in which reproduction and the
distribution of consumption takes place. However, the analytical
framework and many of the results in this section provide the basis
for the behavioral analysis to be presented in the next section.
Consider stationary schemes in which the birth rate and
mortality rates remain constant over an indefinitely long period
of time and in which the distribution of consumption by age remains
constant in each time period. Mote that the assumption of constant
vital rates implies a fixed age distribution and a constant rate
of population growth. Also note that the assumption that the
distribution of consumption by age remains constant in each period
implies that the life cycle distribution of consumption for each
individual also remains constant. That is, if the cross-section
distribution of consumption by age is C =C,C
=C2and C =C38
for all t, then the life cycle consumption of an individual born
1 1 2 2 in period t who survives through old age is C =C ,C1
=C
and C2 =C3.
Let B be the number of births per adult, s1 be the survival
rate to adulthood and 2 be the conditional survival rate to old
age and assume that all births occur at the beginning of adulthood.
Assuming constancy of these vital rates over a long period of time,
elementary stable population theory implies that the rate of
population growth per generation, n, will be equal to the net
reproduction rate, NRR =s1B
=ri.Inaddition, the age distribution
will be stable such that for every adult in the population there
will be s2/(s1B) elderly and B children. Since each adult
produces C units of output, the distribution of consumption by age
in each period must satisfy the constraint
S
= -g—- c3+C2+BC1. (4)
s1 B
It is now possible to derive an expression for the efficient
level of fertility using the following definition of efficiency:
the efficient level of fertility is defined as that level of
births per adult that maximizes adult consumption, holding con-
stant the level of consumption of children and adults at any
arbitrary level. Rewriting (4), this definition corresponds to
the maximization problem
S
maxC2 =C-—?.__ c3-BC1 (5)
B s1B
where C, C3 and C' are treated as constants. The necessary
condition for a maximum is9
2 s dC=23 - = 0 (6) dB s1B2
Solving (6) for the efficient level of fertility, we obtain
the expression
B =(C3/Cl)½(s2/s1)½ (7)
Note that the efficient level of fertility is higher, the higher
is the ratio of old age consumption to child consumption. The
intuition behind this result is that higher fertility, and hence
more rapid population growth, shifts the age distribution so as
to reduce the fraction of elderly and increase the fraction of
children relative to productive adults. As the consumption of
the elderly is increased relative to the consumption of children,
the burden of support is reduced by having relatively more adults
per elderly person. This is accomplished by increasing the
birth rate.
Assuming that the level of fertility is efficient, we may
substitute (7) back into the constraint (4) to obtain the
efficient consumption possibility frontier
C =C2+2(C3C1)½(s2/s1)½ (8)
This expression tells us the maximum level of adult consumption,
C2, that is attainable forany given level of old age and child
Consumption.
The efficient consumption possibility frontier in (8) is
illustrated diagrammatically by the curved line AB in Figure 1Figure 1: Efficient Consumption Possibilities Frontier









where the vertical axis measures old age consumption (C3)
and the horizontal axis measures adult consumption (C2). The
level of child consumption is assumed to be set at some constant
level sufficient to allow for survival (i.e. &￿ I).Each point
on AB corresponds to a particular efficient level of births as
defined by (5).If the birth rate were not efficient, the attain-
able distributions of consumption between adults and the elderly
would lie inside the frontier AB. These points would be inefficient
in the sense that the consumption of individuals in a givenage
group could be increased without decreasing the consumption of any
individual in other age groups.
As I noted earlier, under stationary conditions the cross-
section distribution of consumption by age is identical to the life
cycle distribution of consumption. Hence, the slope of AB at any
given point gives the rate at which an adult must reduce his current
consumption in order to increase his old age consumption. This




where 71= s1B=NRRis the generation rate of population. growth.
The absolute value of the slope of the efficient consumption
possibility curve is also equal to (l+p)/s2 where
l+p =s2C3/BC1
=s2(C3/C1)½(s1/s2)½ (10)12
and p is the average social rate of return to investments in
children. The justification for this terminology is as follows.
Consider a representative adult in period t.If he survives to old
age, he will receive an old age consumption level of C4 =C3
units of food which are produced by the adult labor force in period
t+l .Thislabor force was born and reared in period t at a total
cost of BC1 units of food that alternatively could have been con-
sumed by the adults in periodt. Hence, the representative adult
in period t achieves an expected total return of s2C3 units of
food in period t+l on a total investment of BC1 units of food in
period t thereby obtaining an average rate of return of p percent
per period where p is defined as in equation (10).
The adjective socia1" modifies the term urate of return
to emphasize that it need not be the ca'se that the old age consumption
of a given elderly person in period t+l is dependent on his own
expenditures on children in period t.For example, it is possible
that a society is organized in such a way that a given individual 'S
old age consumption is financed entirely by monetary saving or a
social security tax and transfer program and is entirely independent
of his own reproductive behavior so that the private return to
investment in children is minus one hundred percent. Still ,the
c3 units of food that are consumed by the elderly in period t+l
are produced by labor that was reared at a social cost ofBC1
units of food in period t. Hence, the social rate of return to
investment in children, as defined in equation (10), is greater
than minus one if the elderly consume more than they produce.13
If the society follows an efficient policy with respect to
fertility and the age distribution of consumption as defined by
equations (7) and (8), then from equations (9) and (10) it follows
that
=p (11)
Put differently, if we observe an economy of the type described
in this paper in which the rate of population growth differs from
the average social rate of return to children, we may infer that the
society is pursuing an inefficient population and distribution
policy and is achieving some point inside the efficient consumption
possibility frontier AB in Figure 1
The curve AB shows all possible efficient life cycle consump-
tion paths that can be maintained for adults in each generation.
The question arises as to whether some paths are superior to
others in terms of the preferences of individuals. One possibility
is to choose that consumption path that maximizes the utility of
the typical, adult in any generation where the adult's utility
function is of the form given in (2). This point is illustrated
by point g in Figure 1, where the adult's indifference curve is
tangent to the consumption possibility frontier.7 At this point,
his life cycle consumption path is (C, C) and the level of
fertility is Bg =(C/C)½(s2/s1)½.
This life cycle allocation will be called the Golden Rule
distribution for the following reason. Suppose that the SBg
surviving children of an elderly parent agree among themselves14
to share equally the costs of supporting their elderly parent.
In choosing the total amount to transfer, they decide to follow
the Golden Rule. That is, they decide to transfer to their
parent the amount of consumption they would like their own children
to transfer to them when they become old.8 The Golden Rule dis-
tribution and the associated Golden Rule level of fertility are
Pareto optimal. Given that the distribution of consumption in
each period is initially at point g, no individual in any generation
can be made better off without making some other person worse off.
In most problems in welfare economics, the Pareto criterion
does not provide a unique way to rank the desirability of alter-
native allocations because there are many possible Pareto optimal
allocations. The present model is no exception because the Golden
Rule distribution (and level of fertility) is only one of many
possible Pareto optimal distributions. Moreover, it is also the
case that there exist many possible non-Pareto optimal allocations
such that there exist changes in the distribution rule and/or
fertility behavior that will increase welfare unambiguously by
making at least one person better off without harming anyone else.
First consider the question of whether a society that has
followed some non-Golden Rule policy in the past could make a
Pareto efficient shift to the Golden Rule policy in some period
t.In order for the policy shift to be Pareto efficient, it is
required that no individual living in period t or in subsequent
periods suffer a reduction in lifetime utility as compared to the
utility he would have achieved under a continuation of the old15
policy.It is easy to prove that a shift to the Golden Rule
policy will be Pareto efficient if and only if the social rate of
return to children under the initial policy is less than the Golden
Rule rate of return.
The proof is as follows. Under the initial policy in period
t-l (which may or may not be an efficient policy) assume that the
birth rate is Bt_i =B0and the age distribution of consumption is
(C1, C1) =(C,C). A continuation of this policy implies
that the elderly in period t would receive a consumption level of
C and that the lifetime utility of adults in period t and there-
after would be UT =U(C,C÷ )= U(C,C) for t= t, t+l ,.
Theold age consumption level of C implies that the social rate of
return on children under the initial policy is defined by (l+p0) =
s2C0/B0
.Hence,the representative adult s budget constraint if
thispolicy is continued in period t is
3
c= — tSlBt_l tt
= (l+p ) —+ C+B0&. 0S1
Apermanent shift in period t to the Golden Rule policywould
resultin a change in the birth rate toB =Bgand a life cycle
consumption profile of (C2, C31) for adults in periods r=t,
t+l Once the steady state is achieved in period t+1,thebudget
constraint will be16




=(1+p)— + c2+B (t= t+l,t+2, .. . )
gS1 g g
where p is the social rate of return on children under the Golden
g
Rule policy. Clearly, a shift to the Golden Rule policy would
benefit each adult in period t and thereafter since U(C, C)
U(C, C).
The only question remaining is whether the policy shift would
be made without harming the elderly in period t. This can be








This inequality states that output per adult, C, is sufficient to
provide the consumption level of C to which the elderly are
"entitled° under the initial policy and, in addition, to provide
for the level of adult consumption and childrearing expenses called
for by the Golden Rule policy. To prove that the feasibility
condition in (13) holds if and only if
P0 Pg
(14)
subtract (12) from (13) to obtain
01/S1[(1+P0)(l+Pg)] =l/i(PoPg)
from which (14) follows immediately.17
If the initial policy implies that the rate of return to
children is greater than the Golden Rule rate (i.e. 0 >Pg)
this argument implies that it will not be possible to shift to the
Golden Rule policy without reducing the welfare of the elderly who
live during the period of transition. Although it might seem
persuasive that a change in policy which harms only one generation
and benefits an indefinitely large number of individuals in current
and future generations represents an increase in social welfare,
such a judgment cannot be made using a Paretian criterion. Indeed,
the preceding proof implies that no shift in policy can be a Pareto
improvement if it results in a social rate of return on children
lower than the rate implied by the initial policy.
However, if the initial policy implies that p0 >p,it is
not necessarily true that the policy is Pareto optimal. The
consumption of the elderly in period t can be maintained at the
initial level of C =Cby any change in policy that satisfies
the constraint p1 >p0where p1 is the social rate of return to
children implied by the new policy. Since >itwould be
best to choose a new policy in which the rate of return is as close
as possible to Pg Hence, assume that p1 =p0.
In this case, the range of policies available in period t
are combinations of and Bt satisfying
3





Given p0 and the choice of B, the onsumption of the elderly in
period t+l is determined by
s2C1 =(l+po)Bt (16)
where s2C1 is the expected value cf the old age consumption of
an adult in period t who will consure C÷1 in period t+l if he
survives to old age and &(1+po)Bt is equal to the amount of output,
that must be transferrd to the elderly by each adult
inperiod t+1 mul tipi ied by s1B, te number of children per adult
inperiod t who survive to adulthood in period t+l. Clearly, the
expected old age consumption in period t+1 of adults in period t
can be increased or decreased by increasing or decreasing the fer-
tility rate in period t.
Eliminating 8 from (15) and (16), it follows that policies
satisfying the constraint =
p0imply that the life cycle con-
sumption path, (C2, C3), of adults in period r =t,t+1 ,... lies
on the linear constraint,
C -(1-p0)1/s1
= + , (17)






The economic interpretation of this constraint is that the
present value of any life cycle consumption path of adults in
period r, discounted at p0, must be equal to "disposable
income" per adult. Disposable income is equal to total output19
per adult, CT, minus the amount of output per adult, (1+p0)/s1
that must be devoted to the consumption of the elderly living
in period t.Sincethe birth rate in period t-1 is assumed to be
Bt_i =B0this constraint implies that the consumption of each
elderly person in period t will be C =C,thus satisfying the
condition that any change in policy not hurt the elderly during
the period of transition.
The geometric interpretation of this constraint is also of
interest. The constraint is represented in Figure 1 by the straight
line DE that is tangent to the efficient consumption possibility
curve AB at point b where the slope of AB is assumed to be equal
to (l+p0)/s2 in absolute value and it is also assumed that
>
Pg.Point b itself corresponds to the situation in which the
rate of population growth is efficient so that =p.All other
points on DE correspond to inefficient rates of population growth
with irp0 so that the life cycle consumption path lies inside
the efficient frontier AB. Specifically, points on DE to the north-
west of point b correspond to ii> p0while those to the southeast
correspond to ii< p.
Given the constraint thatp1 =p0,the Pareto optimal policy
is to select a fertility rate, B, such that the corresponding
life cycle consumption profile (C, C1) maximizes U. =U(C,C1)
subject to the constraint in equation (17). This Pareto optimal
profile is indicated by point d in Figure 1 where the indifference
curve U is tangent to the constraint DE.It is clear from
inspection of Figure 1 ,thatthe Pareto optimal consumption profile20
must occur at a point on DE to the southeast of point b so that the
Pareto optimal rate of population growth, ir,willbe lower than
the social rate of return on children if >
Pg.
Since ir < p0,
it follows that the Pareto optimal policy must be inefficient in
the sense that the optimal consumption profile will lie inside
the efficient consumption possibility curve AB.
The Old Age Security Hypothesis and Fertility Behavior
The problems of reproduction and distribution are central
to the survival of any society and to the welfare of its members.
The solution to these problems in our hypothetical society is
complicated by the assumption that each individual is a selfish
economic man who cares only for his own consumption. Adults who
are the only productive individuals in society would appear to
have no incentive to reproduce and care for children nor do they
appear to have any incentive to provide for the elderly. Clearly,
any viable society must place constraints on the pursuit of individual
self-interest and provide an institutional framework to cope with
the fact that the human condition entails dependency at the
beginning and, often, at the end of life.
The family is the universal institutional solution to the
problem of reproduction and the nurture of the young.In
traditional societies, the old age security hypothesis -suggests
that the family also represents the solution to the problem of
dependency among the elderly and, further, that old age security
and reproductive motivation are closely connected. To incorporate21
this hypothesis into a microeconomic model, I shall assume that
parents may inculcate their children with a sense of obligation to
support their elderly parents when they grow up. This "distribu-
tional norm" overrides to a limited degree the otherwise self-
seeking nature of individuals in our model.In particular, I
shall assume for the present that parents have no preference for
children as such; their only motivation for bearing and rearing
children is the expectation that their children will provide trans-
fers to them in old age. Thus, children are treated as pure capital
goods in a world in which food is not storable and no other means
is available to transform consumption during one period life into
consumption in a later period.
In this model, I shall assume that the distributional norm
takes an extremely simple form that I shall call a "fixed
distribution" rule. Under such a rule, an adult feels obligated
to transfer a fixed amount of food, ,tohis elderly parent
and the rule is transmitted from parent to child across genera-
tions. The "strength" of the distribution rule is measured
by the magnitude of E,whichmay vary from family to family,
among different cultural groups, or over time, in response to
economic changes such as physical separation of adults from
their children caused by migration or social change such as the
importation of the idea of individualism from more modern cultures.
For the present, however, the value ofwill be assumed to be
identical in all families and through all generations.
Since parents are assumed to have no interest in the welfare22
of their children beyond their survival to adulthood, I assume
that parents produce their children at least cost by setting
the level of consumption per child at C1 =Iwhere I is the
minimum amount of food required for survival to adulthood. (Note
that there remains an exogenous child mortality risk, l-s1).
This treatment of the cost of children ignores for simplicity
a variety of issues that should be incorporated into a more
complete model. For example, if a child is capable of performing
some productive labor, its parent would be expected to have the
child work in order to reduce the cost of his investment. Inclusion
of child labor would not affect any of our qualitative conclusions,
providing the net cost of children is positive. Otherwise, parents
would choose to have the maximum possible number of children what-
ever the strength of the family's distribution rule.By the same
token, I ignore the opportunity cost in terms of food production
foregone of adult time devoted to child care. A more serious
omission is my implicit assumption that the quality of labor is
exogenous. This ignores the possibility that a child's productive
capacity as an adult can be altered by investments in human capital
in the form of health, education, or training. It should be noted
that the assumption of a fixed distribution rule is ill-suited to
the analysis of investments in children's human capital by parents
because the return per child, ,doesnot vary with its productive
capacity.
In our simple model is the PaYment per surviving child
to his surviving parent so that s2C1 =siBE.Abstracting23
from uncertainty caused by the fact that survival israndom, the
expected private rate of return to children is defined by
1+ =s2C1 = (19)
BI
I
whereis the rate of discount per period such that the present
value of the expected transfers from children in period t+l
is equal to the expenditures in children in period tSince
each of the determinants ofis an exogenous constant, the private
rate of return is also exogenous and independent of the number of
children. Note thatmay be either positive or negative, the
latter being more likely the weaker the family's distribution rule,
the higher is the rate of child mortality and the higher is the
cost per child. Under the assumptions of this model, it should
also be noted that the private rate of return to children, ,
isequal to the social rate of return, p, as defined i equation
(10). As I pointed out earlier, the private and social rates of
return to children may diverge if, for example, all or part of the
consumption of the elderly is financed by past monetary savings
or through a tax and transfer program.
The typical adult in period t faces the budget constraint
Ct = + C+IBt (20)
where s2c is the expected transfer to his elderly parent (again,
I ignore the fact that the existence of a surviving parent is
random), C is his own consumption andIBt are his total expen-
ditures on Bt children. The parent's oldage consumption,
conditional on his survival to old age, is24
=siEBt
= (21)
Substituting (21) into (20), the adult's expected wealth con-
straint in period t is
c-— — c2+2 22
ts2c— l+
The adult is assumed to choose his level of current consumption,
C, and future consumption, ,bymaximizing his lifetime util-
ity, Ut =U(C,C÷1), subject to the wealth constraint in (22).
Let the adult's optimal life cycle consumption path be
(C, C1). From (21), it is clear that his optimal level of




Thus,the demand for births in this model is derived from the demand
for old age consumption, and expenditures on children, IBt, in effect
measure the level of saving by the adult.
Specifically, let the demand for old age consumption be written
as a function of the exogenous variables of the model as follows:
=G(C,l÷, ,s1
,s2,0) (24)
where 8 is a taste parameter measuring the strength of the adult's
preference for current relative to future consumption (i.e. his
subjective rate of time preference). The lower is the rate of time25
preference (i.e. the lower is e), the higher will be the demand
for old age consumption and the higher will be level of fertility,
and the level of "demographic saving," Ij. Note that this
implication is diametrically opposed to the view that is sometimes
expressed that high fertility among the poor is a result of their
myopia concerning the future consequences of their current behavior.
If, as the old age security hypothesis implies, children are the
"poor man's capital," the least myopic will accumulate the most
capital
For our current purposes, two important characteristics of
the demand for old age consumption and the derived demand for
births are the elasticities of these demands with respect to
variations in family income (or adult labor productivity), C, and
to variations in one plus the rate of return to children, l+p.
Define and c, respectively, as the elasticities of C3 with
respect to C and l+p and c and ras the elasticities of B with
respect to C and l+p. From (23), it is clear that c = and
=s-i. (25)
The appropriate interpretation of c(=ri.) is as a measure
of the elasticity of saving with respect to wealth. This
elasticity is surely positive and is usually found, at least in
developed countries, to be very close to one. Thus, our model
implies that the elasticity of births with respect to family
income (or adult labor productivity) is positive and probably
close to unity. This implication appears to be contrary to empirical26
fertility differentials by income level in agrarian populations
in many developing countries. Commonly, thegross correlation
between fertility and family income is negative and, at most,
becomes only slightly positive when other independent variables
are controlled. These empirical observations might be interpreted
as evidence against the old age security hypothesis.
In my view, this interpretation would be premature. For
example, as I show in another paper (Willis, 1978), the cross-
section correlation between family income and fertility will tend
to be negative under conditions of land scarcity and diminishing
returns even though each family would increase its fertility in
response to an exogenous increase in its income. The reason
for this is reverse causation: families (or cultural groups)
in which fertility demand is high (e.g. because the rate of time
preference, 0, is low) and who maintain land with the family,
subdividing it among surviving children, will tend to have rela-
tively small land endowments and low incomes.If rental markets
for land or markets for agricultural labor develop, the poorer,
high fertility families will tend to become tenants or suppliers
of agricultural labor while the richer, low fertility families
will tend to become landlords or demanders of labor.9
The elasticity of old age consumption with respect to one
plus the private rate of return on children must be positive (i.e.
>0).This is the case for two reasons. First, an increase
incaused, say, by a stronger distribution rule in which each
child contributes more than before to his elderly parent makes27
old age consumption cheaper in terms of adult consumption foregone
so that the individual will tend to substitute toward C1 and
away from C. Second, in the short run (i.e. in period t) an
increase in p causes an increase in the real wealth of the adult
family head in the sense that he could maintain his fertility
constant and still achieve a higher level of old age consumption
since the contribution from each child has gone up.In the long
run (i.e. from period t+l onwards), this wealth effect is counter-
balanced by the increased contribution the adult must make to his
own elderly parent. As I show later, this long run negative wealth
effect is not as large as the positive short run wealth effect if
is lower than the Golden Rule rate of return, the case that I
believe to be empirically relevant.
From the point of view of the effect of variations in p
onfertility behavior, the crucial question about the magnitude
of is whether it is greater or less than unity, as can be seen
from the relationship r =-lin (25).I believe that a fairly
strong case can be made for hypothesizing that is less than one
so that is negative in poverty-stricken societies. Since
expenditures on births are equivalent in this model to savings,
this hypothesis is equivalent to the hypothesis that the interest
elasticity of savings is negative at low interest rates.
The argument is made most' easily by example. Suppose for
some initial value of l+ (or E)thatan adult chooses to have one
child and that his old age consumption is virtually at the minimum
biological subsistence level. Now suppose that l+ (or )falls28
to one—half its previous level. The adult must either choose to
starve to death in old age or he must increase his fertility to
two children in order to maintain a survival level of old age
consumption. The latter course of action strikes me as the more
likely. It would imply that =0and that n =-1.These are
the lower bounds on these two elasticities. As the level of income
increases, creating a margin for individuals to substitute away
from old age consumption toward relatively cheaper adult consumption
as l+ falls, I would expect to increase in value and to
become less negative and, perhaps even positive, at sufficiently
high levels of income.In poor societies, however, I believe it
is reasonable to hypothesize that low levels of transfers to the
elderly per child will be associated with high levels of fertility.
This hypothesis is consistent with the results of studies in
LDC's in which it is found that the rate of return to investments
in children is negative when the level of fertility is high)°
Such evidence is often interpreted to mean that the old age security
hypothesis is false and that the "economic motivation" for child-
bearing is weak, despite contrary indications from attitudinal
surveys in which parents say that they expect support from their
children in old age and that this expectation is one of the
important reasons for having a large family. The observed high
level of fertility is then either attributed to the intrinsic
desirability of children (i.e. a consumption motive in which
children provide direct utility to their parents); to irrational
fatalism (e.g. "I will have as many children as God wills");29
to non-rational behavior resulting from pro—fertility customs
or norms; or to an inability to control fertility caused by a
lack of availability of contraceptive techniques or knowledge.
While any or all of these factors may well be influential
in a given population, it may not benecessary to invoke them
in order to explain the coincidence of a high fertility rate
and a low or negative rate of return to investments in children.
In the model presented in this section, such evidence does not
imply that the economic motivation for childbearing is weak.
Rather, it suggests that the economic motivation may be desper-
ately strong.
Population Policy and Economic Welfare
The view that the rate of population growth in the developing
world is too high and that policies to reduce fertility would be
socially beneficial is widely accepted in both scholarly and
policymaking communities. Although economic studies by Coale and
Hoover (1958), Enke (1960) and many others have supported this
view, significant skepticism about Its validity has been voiced
by economists such as Robinson and Horlacher (1971) and Blandy
(1974). The latter writers suggest that to support the view that
population growth is too rapid it is necessary to demonstrate that
there are 1externalities" that result in a divergence between the
social benefits and costs of children and the private benefits and
costs that guide individual couples in their reproductive behavior.
With the possible exception of issues surrounding family planning,
my impression is that current research has not provided a firm30
conceptual and empirical justification for viewing private repro-
ductive decisions in the developing world as socially non-optimal.
With this in mind, it is useful to ask whether the model
presented in this paper can provide some insight into the question
of excessive population growth in the less developed countries.
Of necessity, the validity of any conclusions drawn from the model
presented in this paper are limited by the extremely simplified
assumptions upon which it is based and the poor quality of evidence
on certain key empirical questions.
For the sake of illustration, suppose that empirical evidence
for some developing country, Country A, shows that the private rate
of return on children, a' is less than the rate of population
growth, ra. Also, assume that the sole source of consumption of the
elderly, aside from their own productive labor, is in the form of
transfers from their children. Then, as I argued earlier, a =
wherea is the social rate of return onchildren.
Given these assumptions the following inferences can be made
about population growth and welfare in Country A.(i) Given that
> a =na,'it can be shown that a < Pg where Pg is the Golden
Rule rate of return on children.(ii) As I proved in the first
section, if p < Pgi the society is following a non-Pareto optimal
policy and it is possible to make a Pareto improving shift to
the Golden Rule policy. Under this policy, the fertility level
would be Bg =(l+7rg)/s1and the contribution per current adult to
the elderly would be g =(l+Pg)I/S2
so that TTg =
Pg
and the life
cycle consumption path of each individual would be (C, C).31
(iii) The initial rate of population growth in Country Amay be
either "too high" or "too low" relative to the Golden Rule rate of
population growth depending on the sign of the interest elasticity
of saving,i.If is negative, as I earlier argued is likely
in poor countries, then >
lrgand, in this sense, the rate of
population growth in Country A is excessive. (iv) Assume that
population growth is excessive according to this criterion. It
is important to stress that a policy which reduces the rate of
population growth from 'Ta toTg but does nothing to alter the return
to children would reduce welfare. The non-optimality involves
both the rate of population growth and theage distribution of
consumption. Correspondingly, policies designed to improve social
welfare must deal with demographic and distributional issues
simultaneously.
Before discussing specific policies, the assertion made in
proposition (i) above needs to be proved. This is accomplished
most easily with a geometric argument.In Figure 2, the curved
line AB represents the efficient consumption possibilities frontier
available to Country A and point g, where the indifferencecurve
=
U(C,C) is tangent to AB, represents the Golden Rule policy.
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Given the assumed data that 'Ta > a in Country A, I wish to
show that one may infer that a <
PgTo demonstrate this, note
that the wealth constraint may be represented by the straight line
tangent to AB at the point where the slope of AB is equal to
(l+•a)/s2 in absolute value. For the moment, assume that <
In this case, the wealth constraint is represented by a line
such as DE which is tangent to AB at point a to the southeast of
point g.Point a itself corresponds to a situation in which the
adult chooses a fertility level, such that the rate of population
growth is equal to the rate of return, a• However, the adult's
utility maximizing choice will occur at the tangency between DE
and his indifference curve Ua =U(C,2,C3) at point a' in Figure 2.
Clearly, point a' must lie to the northwest of point a on DE.
Hence, the fertility level corresponding to point a' must be larger
than the fertility level, corresponding to point a so that
TT > a So far I have shown that if a < Pg optimizing behavior
implies that a > a Using the same line of argument as above, it
is easy to confirm that the optimum fertility choice would imply
Tiaa if a with =
Pgimplied by a =Pg•Therefore,
it is appropriate to infer that data showingira > a implies that
< Pg which, in turn, implies that a shift to the Golden Rule
policy would be Pareto optimal.
To summarize these normative implications, evidence that
the rate of return to investments in children is negative in
societies in which the rate of population growth is positive34
implies that the division of consumption between the elderly and
productive adults is both non-Pareto optimal and inefficient.
Itfurther impl ies that the actual rate of return to children is
lower than the Pareto optimal Golden Rule rate of return and
(givenr <0)that the actual rate of population growth is more
rapid than the Golden Rule rate. The utility of each individual
in the current and all future generations could be improved if
somehow each child could be persuaded to increase the amount
thathe contributes to his dependent elderly parent to the Golden
Rule level in return for the promise that his own children will
likewiseincrease their contribution to him.In response to the
prospective increase in the generosity of his children, each parent
would voluntarily choose to reduce his fertility to the Golden
Rule level.
In the process of socializing their children to a sense of
obligationto contribute to their support in old age, presumably
the selfish parents in our model are doing the best they can to
overcomethe innate selfishness of their children. Indeed,
from the short run perspective of any given parent, it would be
best of all if he could persuade his children to maintain them-
selves at the minimum survival level and transfer all their
surplus product to him. The apparent fact that parents, even in
traditional societies, cannot convert their children into slaves
may be gratifying testimony to an inborn spirit of independence
among the young, but it does suggest that the problem of ineffi-
ciently high rates of population growth is unlikely to be remedied
by private action.35
It would seem that collective action in the familiar form
of a mandatory pay-as-you-go social security tax and transfer
scheme offers an ideal way out of this dilemma. After all, if
the current adults would like to have higher contributions from
their children than they are able to persuade them to provide
voluntarily, they could exercise the political power that their
children do not as yet possess to pass a law under which each
adult is taxed by an amount s2(Eg -a''the proceeds of which are
transferred to the elderly.
This scheme has two defects. First, in the nature of the
politics of self-interest the adults in period t will find it advan-
tageous to pass a social security law to take effect in period t+l
when they stand to benefit without paying any of the costs. Sym-
metrically, their grown children in period t+l might like the law
but would like it best if its implementation were delayed until
period t+2. Thus, in politics as in the home, the achievement of
an increase in the utility of each selfish individual requires,
paradoxically, some sort of social compact, to use Samuelson's
phrase (Samuelson, 1958), that allows them to transcend their self-
interest.
The second defect in the scheme lies in a technical failure
in the wording of the law. As it was proposed, the law states
that a tax is to be placed on the adults of period t (or period
t+l or whenever the social compact is finally attained) and the
benefits to be distributed to the elderly in the same period.
The law should have read that the tax is to be placed on each adult36
with the revenue to be distributed to his own elderly parent.
The defective law, of course, would reward the childless as much
as those who bear the costs of rearing a taxpayer to maturity.
The privately rational adult in period t will reduce his own
fertility, thereby saving these costs, in anticipation of a lump
sum transfer 52(Cg - multiplied by one plus the percentage
increase in the number of adults in period t+l relative to period
t. Under the non-defective form of the law, this increase would
be precisely l+11g. yielding each elderly person C, the Golden Rule
level of old age consumption. Under the defective form, the in-
crease in population will be less than this because of reproduc-
tive shirking.
An alternative approach which avoids conditioning the amount
transferred to the elderly by their past fertility is available.
This is simply to accompany a social security tax and transfer
scheme with subsidies for childrearing expenses. Casual observa-
tion suggests that, wittingly or not, those societies in which the
welfare state has progressed furthest in taking over responsibility
for old age security and other forms of security from the family
have also provided the largest subsidies for childrearing, both
explicitly in the form of family allowances and tax deductions and
implicitly in the form of public education.37
Foo tno tes
'See Caldwell (1976) fora recent statement of this view.
Also see Mamdani (1972), Clark (1977) and Boserup (1965).
2For an exception, see Neher (1971).
31n perhaps the most thorough investigation of this question
to date, Mueller (1976) concludes that the rate of return to
children is negative in most peasant agricultural settings.
Further support for this view is offered by Repetto (1976), Ohlin
(1969) and Robinson (1972) among others.It should be noted that
none of these studies is based on fully adequate data. Recently,
Cain's analysis of household data from rural Bangladesh suggests
that the rate of return to children there may be positive (Cain
1977, 1978). For examp1, he concludes: "Male children appear
to become net producers at least by age 12, and compensate for their
own and one sister's cumulative consumption by age 22." (Cain,
1977, p. 224).
4See Willis (1978).
5Two exceptions are papers by Neher (1971) and Ben-Zion
and Razin (1975). The approach in this paper is significantly
different from either of these papers. After this draft was
written, I also discovered relevant papers by Samuelson (1975,
1976).
6For example, see Norman Ryder's comment (Ryder, 1973) on
my earlier theoretical paper on fertility behavior (Willis, 1973).
7Unless otherwise noted, I shall assume in this paper that
the adult's indifference curves are more convex than the efficient
consumption possibility curve so that there is a unique point of
tangency.38
8Clearly, this interpretation of the Golden Rule excludes
the possibility of transfer rules that differ from one generation
to the next. For example, the adults of period t would prefer
to receive more than the Golden Rule level of transfer from their
children provided that they could maintain a low level of transfers
to their own parents.
9Another possibility should be mentioned.Suppose, contrary
to the assumption of my model ,thatthe elderly are productive and
that their old age consumption is equal to the sum of their •own
output plus transfers from their children. Ceteris paribus,
any (expected) increase in the productivity of the elderly in period
t+l would reduce the demand for saving in period t and, therefore,
would reduce fertility in period t.If the productivity of adults
and the elderly increased by the same proportion and =c
=
thedemand for children would remain unchanged. Hence, in a model
of the demand for children as assets, the sign of the "income11
elasticity of demand for children depends on age-specific changes
in income. The possible empirical importance of this consideration
is indicated by evidence cited by Mueller (1976) which shows that
elderly males continue to be productive in peasant agriculture in
many societies.
10See the studies cited in f.n. 3 above.39
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